-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 pjones' statement about Secure Boot on 2021-12-02: I'm involved in Secure Boot signing in various distros in several ways. I wrote and maintain pesign ( https://github.com/rhinstaller/pesign ), which is used for signing EFI binaries, and I'm one of the upstream maintainers of shim ( https://github.com/rhinstaller/shim ), which most Linux distros use to transition from the firmware's security domain to the kernel's. I'm also responsible for Fedora and RHEL's builds of pesign, shim, and grub2. I'm not responsible for the kernels for RHEL or Fedora, nor for determining which of them finally get signed for Secure Boot. I have been responsible for generating keys for signing Fedora's binaries. As the guy who gets shim signed for Fedora: At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in Fedora's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys, except by one lazy troll on the internet. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in Fedora's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. As the guy who gets shim signed for RHEL: At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in RHEL's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in RHEL's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. As a person involved in CentOS implementation in an advisory role: I am not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in CentOS's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of CentOS's signing keys. As the guy who gets shim signed for CentOS: At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in RHEL's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in CentOS 7's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. As the upstream maintainer of pesign and an upstream maintainer of shim: At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor into either shim or pesign. I am also unaware of any other contributor to shim or pesign having been contacted with warrants of of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor into either shim or pesign. November 2017 update: One rando from the internet has sent me an email to tell me that I should "consider myself approached" regarding the Fedora signing keys. Here's what the guy with way too much time on his hands said: - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 14:46:07 -0400 From: Eduardo Gines Subject: Fedora SecureBoot signing keys Hey Peter, I'd like you to share with me key used for signing shim in Fedora Project Linux. Consider yourself approached. Adiós, Eduardo - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Just so we're clear, I don't consider a lazy email to be the sort of contact we're talking about here. So while I've changed the language on the Fedora section above to reflect that I have, in fact, been contacted in /some/ way by a non-governmental entity, in the future if this is the amount of effort you put into this, I'm just going to mark it spam. Congratulations, you found a new way to be bad for the world, and it's mostly just tedious. Most people just stick to the old ways. September 2018 update: Changed some CentOS stuff around to better reflect the current division of labor. March 2021 update: There's been some discussion about some documents published by the National Security Agency[0]. In these, they discuss deployment strategies and customizations regarding UEFI and Secure Boot. [0] Here: https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/what-we-do/cybersecurity/professional-resources/csi-uefi-lockdown.pdf https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/what-we-do/cybersecurity/professional-resources/BootSecurityModesAndRec_20190522.pdf https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/15/2002497594/-1/-1/0/CTR-UEFI-Secure-Boot-Customization-UOO168873-20.PDF https://github.com/nsacyber/Hardware-and-Firmware-Security-Guidance/blob/master/secureboot/Linux.md -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJhqPR8AAoJEO7SZrcPT+8Q73oP/j0QVfB0TzfsiJRBd5e17LQK yAAeGo5hVrx1Q5Mx1K7uytToiRLDgff/4aGI/M9zWxRSX0uxQn8r3cvHBEdENYwx lLR8ORuIZ2cMLimPHWhbeFax60eGHNOvqepAOGjb6h17hBTTJrStPd4a9WFnRvN3 w3b8VxYS8ySj/p9fKLS+v1VsvDJinPofKItM5sCQWiSHwcPYvSYia97BUHlFclkE rVTXGD5SAvDueYJznNC9r2NXdXVIeil2blwpArNuMbDBqUvxNZuTNS+qqwHsXRTy ItfuoUjFwM21lZHuBhyTFZL013NzO0qO4TZ850sHTu1ico4cwSZuSH5OmT93ztda YXTTKTLuwCgo9SwrQZ6I9Od/fTXzPDXM/7E0FEIqoPGGmDEH0wj7ZP347xJfdL1z 3s46jUPq1Phy8p8uXq8j4b+AYGABXWWtn9Cmtu2KRFtHA1KD7KDi8e1x+WTYoYye 1JK+9X/VSI1x0U8rsi5iAyro0QU+qcfWHbv9bpMfiYdD5IaUOXFDd2aF70zi25bI qQu6S/fWphuBDW0VQkfHPke1eUqUuiCqNy/siA1VmU+a1s9//2V57pOTS1KInrsj HGle4Sls/5A9Wjc1WRovk6nL2Qcr8bXOX910fk8AfhNUS0xtDRiF7FQiuB/JUIMo FFFNZk+Qs8FTuuTUmehf =BvY/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----