-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 pjones' statement about Secure Boot on 2019-12-03: I'm involved in Secure Boot signing in various distros in several ways. I wrote and maintain pesign ( https://github.com/rhinstaller/pesign ), which is used for signing EFI binaries, and I'm one of the upstream maintainers of shim ( https://github.com/rhinstaller/shim ), which most Linux distros use to transition from the firmware's security domain to the kernel's. I'm also responsible for Fedora and RHEL's builds of pesign, shim, and grub2. I'm not responsible for the kernels for RHEL or Fedora, nor for determining which of them finally get signed for Secure Boot. I have been responsible for generating keys for signing Fedora's binaries. As the guy who gets shim signed for Fedora: At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in Fedora's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys, except by one lazy troll on the internet. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in Fedora's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. As the guy who gets shim signed for RHEL: At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in RHEL's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in RHEL's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. As a person involved in CentOS implementation in an advisory role: I am not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in CentOS's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of CentOS's signing keys. As the guy who gets shim signed for CentOS: At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in RHEL's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor have I at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. I am also not aware of anyone else involved in our signing that has been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor in CentOS 7's signed secure boot binaries, including shim, grub2, the kernel, and pesign, nor am I aware of any other involved party having at any time been approached about disclosure of our signing keys. As the upstream maintainer of pesign and an upstream maintainer of shim: At no point have I been contacted with warrants of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor into either shim or pesign. I am also unaware of any other contributor to shim or pesign having been contacted with warrants of of any kind, or any similar instrument, or in any way, from governmental or non-governmental entities, about inclusion of any kind of malware or backdoor into either shim or pesign. November 2017 update: One rando from the internet has sent me an email to tell me that I should "consider myself approached" regarding the Fedora signing keys. Here's what the guy with way too much time on his hands said: - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 14:46:07 -0400 From: Eduardo Gines Subject: Fedora SecureBoot signing keys Hey Peter, I'd like you to share with me key used for signing shim in Fedora Project Linux. Consider yourself approached. Adiós, Eduardo - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Just so we're clear, I don't consider a lazy email to be the sort of contact we're talking about here. So while I've changed the language on the Fedora section above to reflect that I have, in fact, been contacted in /some/ way by a non-governmental entity, in the future if this is the amount of effort you put into this, I'm just going to mark it spam. Congratulations, you found a new way to be bad for the world, and it's mostly just tedious. Most people just stick to the old ways. September 2018 update: Changed some CentOS stuff around to better reflect the current division of labor. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJd5tRqAAoJEO7SZrcPT+8QJ1QP/iFnnBFQPeH2f3aUZmCrq1b8 yo6bPKOtxa3CaAAUzz5QgraDYaXLj6N2ZykN2A3AQ22Z5IVzsW4R/8wcc1pwyAde DdK2k7wtHSZ4nberGL6pqw8WIkK7Agteep26z+lJZte8rOCk/yL62PKARJExS5Pg FurL9LE7T/cVq2YU0fOvaWgQAXiHrCYjUFurB/H33rkWqAZgxbmkPHfmnfd1Omob TEH8zs2qF3PjAHDP+mEwcXb44kBTmRmrzgbL52FEf9ew8wQ1pCML5XiFLo06ONlG v0HH2vNdidKBK0tXwoMtnpJUYbAKvk3YdCP9dHGcEE+9YtjG0PiWSqGlJH9Wqc0b A4ERYAa3HLqjJZxn5zLsx0vI01YMO4l4Ds9Dts78973EARmE6ewI0NEHG9DLuYCf +TaeWEal0Geh5NJDiM2XSjapnfRW/ZtJPETK+5GCNL1p6gWSONCtEbkk7f/TgpYr HrVJIFC2PLCpFDa4/d2ynwAmGslHU8OVBZnIj3Hq2B7j+8gdVxaMXgXUBz0+FowE xVeBRA6l8oAX3X8n06Evl72mSlD7RN/7Gbjn7p9JnXpHbQTxOfrDABZOazMDtBDk tr0ku5sNy/7UjdvmXsCmHzwUxgg1azCmk35yNRQRT4uESQlNpeugTAIelphrHVix ORwMDfhwTWv1FqnH6zh9 =fozL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----